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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a supervisor at a company that participates in a
competitive market. Your company’s success is attributed to its trade
secrets: technological processes; marketing, production, and distribution
strategies; etc. that are unknown to your competitors. One day an
employee informs you she is leaving your company to work for your
competitor. The employee, because of her position, had access to your
company’s trade secrets; consequently, in the wake of her departure,
you are concerned about protecting the trade secrets. What options do
you have from stopping your employee from taking the position with
your competitor and using or disclosing your trade secrets? Because of
inconsistency in the relevant law, the answer is not simple. In many
states you could gain an injunction against the employee from working
for your competitor if you could show the employee would be unable to
perform duties for your competitor without inevitably using or
disclosing your company’s trade secrets: known as the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. Further, in other states no such protection is
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afforded and your employee is free to work for your competitor.
Ultimately, the applicable remedy will differ depending on where the
action is commenced.
It is evident that, after analyzing the states’ applications of the
doctrine, a uniform standard is needed. The ultimate solution is the
adoption of federal statutes regulating trade secret law, much like the
Copyright Act, Patent Act, and Lanham Act regulate the other areas of
intellectual property. However, this comment will focus specifically on
a solution to the states’ inconsistent applications of inevitable disclosure
by providing (1) an introduction to trade secret law and inevitable
disclosure; (2) an introduction to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and its
subsequent enactment by the states; (3) an overview of the Seventh
Circuit’s application of inevitable disclosure in PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Redmond; (4) a state-by-state analysis of the doctrine; and finally (5) a
proposed standard for the uniform application of the doctrine.
II. TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
DOCTRINE
A. Introduction to Trade Secrets
A trade secret is generally any information that is useful and
1
private. Trade secret subject matter has been defined by three main
2
sources of law. The first definition frequently cited comes from the first
Restatement of Torts, providing that “[a] trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
3
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”
This
definition, although widely cited and still used by some states, has been
4
dropped in favor of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,
which states, “[a] trade secret is any information that can be used in the
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage
5
over others.” However, as will be discussed later, the majority of the
states adopted the definition presented in the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act. Ultimately, a trade secret can be summed up as (1) information (2)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2010).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment B (1939).
POOLEY, supra note 1, at § 1.01.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
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that is valuable because of its secrecy and (3) whose owner reasonably
6
tries to maintain that secrecy.
Additionally, trade secrets are statutorily protected against
misappropriation as long as they are not publicly disclosed or
7
independently created. The two general types of misappropriation are
8
acquisition by (1) improper means or (2) disclosure.
There is no clear definition of “improper means,” so determining
whether improper means were used to misappropriate a trade secret is
9
highly factual and engulfs a wide range of scenarios. Improper means
ranges from an employee copying his employer’s confidential
10
information knowing he is leaving the employer, to a person renting an
11
airplane to photograph a competitor’s under-construction factory.
Misappropriation due to disclosure occurs when someone is given
access to a trade secret and subsequently uses or discloses the trade
12
secret without consent from the owner.
Furthermore, courts will
recognize misappropriation due to disclosure in the presence, or
13
absence, of an express contract, i.e. an employment agreement.
In the event of misappropriation, the general remedy is an
14
injunction. However, courts can also award damages in the form of
15
royalties, lost profits, attorney’s fees, and/or punitive damages. Courts
will issue injunctions at their discretion by applying the following
factors: (1) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm; (2)
whether the plaintiff is likely to be successful on the merits; (3) the
balance of equity and harm between the parties; and (4) the interest of
16
the public.

6. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
7. DAVID W. QUINTO & STUART H. SINGER, TRADE SECRETS 44 (Oxford
University Press 2009).
8. LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 466 (Md. 2004); see also
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1985).
9. LeJeune, 849 A.2d at 451.
10. See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010).
11. See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1970).
12. See infra Section V (discussing cases in which misappropriation is threatened
due to disclosure by a former employee).
13. QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 54–58.
14. POOLEY, supra note 1, at § 7.02(2).
15. Id. at § 7.02(3).
16. Id. at § 7.02(2); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §
44 (1995).
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B. Introduction to Inevitable Disclosure
In general, the inevitable disclosure doctrine allows courts to enjoin
an employee from working for his employer’s competitors because of
the threat of misappropriation. The employer must show that its
employee had access to its trade secrets “and the former employee has
such similar responsibilities with the new employer as to make it
inevitable that he will use or disclose those trade secrets in the
17
performance of his job duties for the new employer.” The idea is that
an employee who wants to succeed at his new position will rely on skills
and information learned from his former employer, including trade
18
secrets. If an employer shows that its former employee will inevitably
disclose its trade secrets to a competitor, the court can grant a
preliminary injunction or, in rare circumstances, a permanent injunction
against that employee from working for the competitor or from
19
participating in certain kinds of work for the competitor.
There is a fundamental tension between competing interests when
applying the doctrine: the need to protect an employer’s confidential,
valuable information and the need to support an employee’s freedom of
20
mobility.
Despite these competing interests, courts have long
recognized inevitable disclosure; however, it was not until the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond that the doctrine gained
21
popularity.
III. THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
Before analyzing the PepsiCo decision, it is important to discuss the
predominant source of trade secret law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
Trade secrets engulf a wide, abstract area of subject matter,
22
extending to any useful information that is kept secret. Consequently,
the law of trade secrets, due to its broad subject matter and its common
law development, as opposed to statutory development like copyrights
and patents, has not been easily bundled into universally applicable
23
As a result, in 1979, the National Conference of
principles.
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, acting on the recommendation
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 56–57 (emphasis added).
Id. at 91.
Id.; UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (1985).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 (1995).
QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 91–92.
POOLEY, supra note 1, at § 1.01.
Id.
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of the American Bar Association, issued the first of two versions of the
24
The primary goal was
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).
uniformity: stemming from the unsatisfactory development of trade
25
secret law among the states. The lack of development was due in part
to the far fewer number of reported judicial opinions regarding trade
secret law in agricultural states compared to commercial states and the
26
uncertain standards and remedies promulgated by the common law.
Ultimately, the commissioners wanted the UTSA to codify the common
27
law of trade secrets.
Subsequently, forty–eight U.S. jurisdictions have adopted either the
UTSA as drafted in 1979 or as amended in 1985, and apply the following
28
definitions and remedies.
UTSA section 1(4) provides what is protected as trade secrets:
‘Trade Secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process,
that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
29
maintain its secrecy.
Furthermore, section 1(2) provides the relevant types of
misappropriation: acquisition by (1) improper means, or (2) disclosure,
without express or implied consent, by improper means or under
30
If
“circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy.”
misappropriation is proven, section 2(a) provides injunctive relief for
31
“actual or threatened misappropriation.”
This section contains
important aspects relating to the duration of an injunction, providing
that an injunction based on inevitable disclosure will be granted for a

24. Id. at § 2.03(1).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 1; see The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA) available at http://www.ndasforfree.com/UTSA.html last visited October 6, 2011
(listing the states that have adopted the UTSA, and their respective statutes).
29. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
30. Id. at § 1(2).
31. Id. at § 2(a).
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32

reasonable time in lieu of the specific information that is threatened.
Section 2(a) is important to the inevitable disclosure doctrine, though,
because the term “threatened misappropriation” is considered the
origin of the doctrine by many states applying their versions of the
UTSA.
However, the most important section of the UTSA is section 8,
which states that “[t]his [A]ct shall be applied and construed to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to
33
the subject of this Act among states enacting it.” The states, however,
have failed to apply their respected versions of the Act in a uniform
way, especially inevitable disclosure. To begin the analysis of the states’
applications of the doctrine it is important to discuss the flagship case on
the subject: PepsiCo.
IV. THE PEPSICO DECISION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond is
considered the prominent case discussing inevitable disclosure after the
adoption of the UTSA.
PepsiCo brought an action seeking a
preliminary injunction against its employee, William Redmond, Jr.
(Redmond), from accepting a position with PepsiCo’s competitor,
34
Quaker. Redmond, who had been employed with PepsiCo for ten
years, had access to PepsiCo’s financial goals and its strategic planning
for the upcoming year; consequently, although he signed a
confidentiality agreement stating he would not disclose confidential
information, PepsiCo was concerned about the secrecy of its trade
secrets. This was mainly due to Redmond’s lack of candor regarding
35
accepting the position at Quaker.
The district court granted an injunction against Redmond from
assuming his position with Quaker for a period of five months, and
granted a permanent injunction preventing him from using or disclosing
36
PepsiCo’s trade secrets. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, determining
that the Illinois Trade Secret Act provided injunctive relief for “actual
37
or threatened misappropriation.” Ultimately, the court concluded “a
plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by
32. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting an
injunction for five months to protect an employers business strategies for the upcoming year).
33. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (1985).
34. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1267.
37. Id.; 765 ILCS 1065/3(a) (2009).
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demonstrating that [the] defendant’s new employment will inevitably
38
lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.” Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit found (1) that Redmond possessed intimate knowledge
of PepsiCo’s strategic goals, which were trade secrets; (2) that the
respected positions were similar and therefore, the knowledge he
39
obtained at PepsiCo would influence his position at Quaker ; and (3)
that Redmond’s actions “demonstrated a lack of candor . . . and proof of
40
[his] willingness to misuse [PepsiCo’s] trade secrets,” i.e. bad faith.
However, the court did not expressly state that bad faith must be
present before injunctive relief will be granted.
After PepsiCo, the inevitable disclosure doctrine gained popularity;
however, despite a workable standard presented by the Seventh Circuit,
the states’ applications of the doctrine have remained inconsistent.
V. THE STATES’ APPLICATIONS OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
Arkansas
Arkansas has adopted a standard similar to PepsiCo. In Cardinal
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transportation Service, Inc., the court
recognized that many federal cases, including PepsiCo, “have held that a
plaintiff may prove a claim of trade-secrets misappropriation by
demonstrating that a defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead
41
him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.” However, in Bendinger v.
Marshalltown Trowel Co., the court failed to grant an injunction,
holding that “the mere fact a person assumes a similar position at a
competitor does not, without more, make it inevitable that he will use or
42
disclose trade secrets.”
Arkansas courts will grant an injunction if a new position will lead to
the inevitable disclosure of a former employer’s trade secrets. However,
courts have established that more than the threat that future acts will
disclose the trade secret is needed; there must be a showing that future
acts will “in all probability” be committed that will disclose the trade
43
secrets.
38. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269; see Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Commc'ns Corp., 707 F.
Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
39. Id. at 1266–67.
40. Id. at 1270.
41. Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d
642, 646 (Ark. 1999) (citing PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995)).
42. Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowel Co., 994 S.W.2d 468, 474 (Ark. 1999)
(quoting AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987)).
43. Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078, 1082 (W.D. Ark.

WIESNER- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

218

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

11/15/2011 10:56 AM

[Vol. 16:1

California
44
California has been hostile to the doctrine.
Courts have
consistently held that the doctrine “creates a de facto covenant not to
compete” and “runs[s] counter to the strong public policy in California
45
favoring employee mobility.” Further “regardless whether a covenant
not to compete is part of the employment agreement, the inevitable
disclosure doctrine cannot be used as a substitute for proving actual or
46
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.”
However, courts are receptive to protecting trade secrets through an
employment agreement that is narrowly drafted for the specific purpose
47
of protecting trade secrets against misappropriation.
Colorado
Colorado, like California, has strong policies favoring employee
mobility. Additionally, courts will not enforce employment agreements
that hinder mobility because they are seen as a restraint on a person’s
right to make a living; however, that right will be protected so long as
48
that person does not use his former employer’s trade secrets to do so.
Colorado courts apply a two prong test to determine whether an
employment agreement will be enforced to protect trade secrets: (1) the
court will “examine the factual situation to determine whether a
restrictive covenant is justified at all;” and (2) the court will look at the
49
terms of the covenant to determine whether it is reasonable.
Although Colorado courts have not explicitly stated they will use the
doctrine to protect trade secrets, like California, they will enforce an
employment agreement that is reasonable in time and geographic scope,
50
and narrowly drafted for the purpose of protecting trade secrets.
Connecticut
Connecticut will apply the doctrine to enforce a non-compete, even
without bad faith.
When . . . a high degree of similarity between an employee’s
former and current employment makes it likely that the former
1999).
44. QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 93.
45. Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 294 (4th Dist. 2002).
Id.
Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare, 252 P.3d 516, 526–27 (Colo. App. 2011).
Id. at 526.
Id.
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employer’s trade secrets . . . will be disclosed either intentionally
or inadvertently, by the employee in the course of his new
employment, enforcement of a covenant not to compete is
51
necessary to protect against such use and disclosure.
In Aetna Retirement Services, Inc. v. Hug, the court granted an
injunction against an employee despite its recognition that the employee
had “unimpeachable integrity” and “honesty [that was] widely respected
52
and admired.” Regardless, the court granted the injunction because it
believed he could not help but inform his new employer of the
53
knowledge he had gained from his past employer. Therefore, it is
evident that Connecticut will apply the doctrine even in the absence of
bad faith.
Delaware
The Delaware case E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. American
Potash & Chemical Corp. was the first decision to use the phrase
54
“inevitable disclosure,” so it is not surprising that Delaware applies the
doctrine regardless of the existence of a non-compete agreement.
In E.I. duPont, the court applied the doctrine stating Delaware law
is “well settled” that when an employee, either expressly or by
implication, has agreed not to disclose his employer’s trade secrets, “the
employer is entitled to an injunction against a threatened use or
55
disclosure of [the trade secrets].”
It is not clear whether bad faith is required. However, in W.L. Gore
v. Wu, the court, recognizing that an employee could not be trusted
because of egregious conduct, expanded an injunction granted by the
lower courts. The court recognized that it “may limit a [former
employee] from working in a particular field if his doing so poses a
56
substantial risk of the inevitable disclosure of trade secrets.”
Florida
Florida has mixed case law. One court stated that Florida’s trade
secret act “does not prohibit a former employee with knowledge of
51. Aetna Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Hug, 1997 WL 396212, 10 (Conn. Super.)
(quoting Gillette Co. v. Williams, 360 F. Supp. 1171, 1176–77 (D.C. Conn. 1973)).
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id.
54. Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee
Mobility v. Employer’s Rights, 3 J. High. Tech. L. 161, 168 (2004).
55. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d
428, 431 (Del. Ch. 1964).
56. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Wu, 2006 WL 2692584, 17 (Del. Ch.).
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57

trade secrets from going to work for a competitor.”
The court
reasoned that the act “prohibits only ‘misappropriation’ of trade secrets,
which means the acquisition, disclosure, and/or use of the information to
58
the disadvantage of the owner of the trade secret.”
However, in Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., the court
upheld an injunction against an employee because “it would seem
logical to assume that his employment by a competitor . . . would
eventually result in a disclosure of [his former employer’s trade
59
secrets].”
Ultimately, the court determined that the employee’s
knowledge of his former employer’s trade secrets was so entwined with
his prospective position that an injunction against disclosure was not
60
enough.
Georgia
Although Georgia does not expressly use the doctrine, one court has
enjoined a company from hiring its competitor’s employee because it
determined the company only wanted the employee to gain a
61
competitive advantage.
The court determined that by hiring its
competitor’s employee, the company was attempting to obtain its
62
competitor’s trade secrets to gain a competitive edge in its industry.
63
Illinois
Indiana
Indiana courts inconsistently apply the doctrine.
In
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, the court, although recognizing
the doctrine, refused to apply it because Indiana’s trade secret act did
“not prohibit a former employee who has knowledge of trade secrets
64
from going to work for a competitor.” The court determined that the
65
However, the court
statute only prohibits misappropriation.
distinguished this case with another Indiana case, Ackerman v. Kimball
International, Inc. In Ackerman, there was clear evidence that the

57. Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326,
1335 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
58. Id.
59. Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
60. Id.
61. Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501, 505 (Ga. 1998).
62. Id.
63. See infra Section IV.
64. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (S.D. Ind.
1998).
65. Id.
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departing employee had no intention of honoring the confidentiality of
his employer’s trade secrets; consequently, a limited injunction was
66
granted prohibiting him from working for a competitor. Ultimately, it
seems that Indiana will enforce a limited injunction, but only when the
threat of misappropriation is shown by bad faith.
Iowa
Iowa courts treat the doctrine as a strict variation of threatened
67
misappropriation.
In Barilla America, Inc. v. Wright, the court,
analyzing PepsiCo, determined that its state statute that illegalized
68
threatened misappropriation included inevitable disclosure. To prove
inevitable disclosure an employer must show (1) that its employee had
access to its trade secrets; (2) that its employee’s new position is similar
to the former position; and (3) “that [the employee] would be able to
69
remember the trade secret in a usable form.” In Barilla, the court
enjoined an employee from taking a position with a competitor because,
although there was no evidence that he memorized any trade secrets,
70
there was proof that he took physical evidence with him.
Kansas
Kansas is yet to apply the doctrine, although it has come close. In
Bradbury Co. v. Teissier-DuCros, the court acknowledged the doctrine
but failed to apply it because the limitation period for the plaintiff’s
71
cause of action had expired. However, when discussing the doctrine,
the court, quoting PepsiCo, provided that an employer was entitled to
relief when:
(1) the employers in question are direct competitors providing
the same or very similar products or services; (2) the employee’s
new position is nearly identical to his old one, such that he could
not reasonably be expected to fulfill his new job responsibilities
without utilizing the trade secrets of his former employer; and (3)
72
the trade secrets at issue are highly valuable to both employers.

66. Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507, 510–11 (Ind. 1995).
67. Barilla America, Inc. v. Wright, 2002 WL 31165069, 9 (S.D. Iowa).
68. Id. at 8–9.
69. Id. at 10.
70. Id.; see also APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa
1997); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Diversified
Fastening Sys, Inc. v. Rogge, 786 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Iowa 1991).
71. Bradbury Co., Inc. v. Teissier-DuCros, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209 (D. Kan.
2006).
72. Id. at 1208 (quoting EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310
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Kentucky
Kentucky is also yet to address the doctrine. In Invesco Institutional
(N.A.), Inc. v. Johnson, the plaintiff included a cause of action for
inevitable disclosure; however, the district court was hesitant to apply it,
stating “[a]bsent some authoritative signal from the legislature or the
courts of [this state], we see no basis for even considering the pros and
73
cons of innovative theories.”
Louisiana
Louisiana has rejected the use of inevitable disclosure, concluding
that an injunction in the absence of actual or threatened
74
misappropriation is a harsh remedy.
Furthermore, in Tubular
Threading, Inc. v. Scandaliato, the court insisted the employer must
show a clear and present need for an injunction because of an
75
immediate threat of disclosure, mere speculation is not enough.
Maryland
76
Like California, Maryland favors employee mobility.
After
balancing the competing public policies of employee mobility against
protection of trade secrets, and finding an injunction against the
disclosure of trade secrets to be an injunction against employee
77
mobility, Maryland courts have rejected inevitable disclosure.
Massachusetts
Massachusetts applies the doctrine, but is yet to officially adopt it or
the UTSA. In Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, the court granted an
injunction against an employee to enforce a non-compete agreement
78
despite bad faith. The court determined the former employer would
be disadvantaged in the absence of an injunction because “it [was]
difficult to conceive how all of the information stored in [the
employee’s] memory [could] be set aside as he applie[d] himself to a
79
competitor’s business . . . .”
Conversely, in Achitext, Inc. v. Kikuchi, the court determined that
Massachusetts had not yet adopted the doctrine but “[e]ven if it were
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
73. Invesco Inst. (N.A.), Inc. v. Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710 (W.D. Ky.
2007).
74. Tubular Threading, Inc. v. Scandaliato, 443 So. 2d 712, 715 (La. Ct. App.
1983).
75. Id.
76. LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 471 (Md. 2004).
77. Id.
78. Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. Supp. 294, 298–300 (D. Mass. 1995).
79. Id. at 297.
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appropriate . . . to rely on the doctrine of ‘inevitable disclosure,’ this
80
situation is not one that would warrant application of the doctrine.”
Ultimately, courts have provided mixed views of the doctrine:
applying it in one case to enforce a non-compete in the absence of bad
faith, and declaring that it is yet to be adopted in another.
Michigan
Michigan is another state lacking definitive case law regarding the
doctrine. In Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation
& Engineering Corp., the court granted a limited injunction against an
employee from performing certain duties during his new employment
with a competitor because there was a threat he would inevitably use his
81
former employer’s trade secrets.
Other courts, however, have held otherwise. In CMI International,
Inc. v. Intermet International Corp., and subsequently Kelly Services,
Inc. v. Greene, it was determined that “for a party to make a claim of
threatened misappropriation, whether under a theory of inevitable
disclosure or otherwise, the party must establish more than the
existence of generalized trade secrets and a competitor’s employment of
82
the party’s former employee who has knowledge of trade secrets.”
Furthermore, some courts acknowledge that the doctrine, although
never adopted in Michigan, “has only been suggested to be applicable to
high executives and key designers of the company’s strategic plans and
83
operations.”
Minnesota
Some Minnesota courts have embraced the doctrine to enforce a
non-compete, while others have been harsh to the doctrine in the
absence of actual or threatened misappropriation.
In La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, the court, applying a state statute that
enjoined “actual or threatened misappropriation,” enforced a noncompete and enjoined an employee form working for a competitor
because he had such intimate knowledge that it was “all but inevitable
that he [would] utilize that knowledge during his work with [the
84
competitor].” The court determined that this “intimate knowledge”
80. Achitext, Inc. v. Kikuchi, 2005 WL 2864244, 3 (Mass.).
81. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont’l Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
654 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
82. CMI Int'l, Inc. v. Intermet Int'l Corp., 649 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002); Kelly Servs., Inc. v. Greene, 535 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 (D. Me. 2008).
83. Degussa Admixtures, Inc. v. Burnett, 471 F. Supp. 2d 848, 856 (W.D. Mich.
2007).
84. La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (applying
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85

made the threat of misappropriation real.
However, some courts have suggested the mere fact that an
employee possesses trade secrets and is taking a comparable position at
86
a competitor is inadequate to warrant an injunction. In International
Business Machine Corp. v. Seagate Technology, Inc., the court denied
injunctive relief in the absence of an actual threat of misappropriation,
stating that protection is a shield, not a sword, and “in the absence of a
covenant not to compete or a finding of actual or an intent to disclose
trade secrets, employees ‘may pursue their chosen field of endeavor in
87
direct competition’ with their prior employer.”
Missouri
Ultimately, Missouri courts have been reluctant to apply the
doctrine, although many courts have thoroughly discussed the doctrine
as presented in PepsiCo. Courts acknowledge the doctrine may be used
in rare circumstances, suggesting “that inevitability alone is insufficient
to justify injunctive relief; rather, demonstrated inevitability in
combination with a finding that there is unwillingness to preserve
88
confidentiality is required.”
Additionally, in H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc. v. Enchura,
the court suggested other factors that might be analyzed in determining
whether to apply the doctrine: whether the employee will have a
decision making role at the new employment; whether the
responsibilities at the respective jobs are similar; whether the employee
will be developing new products; whether the employee was involved in
the creation of the trade secrets at issue; and whether the trade secrets
89
are easily subject to memorization.
New Jersey
New Jersey has not adopted the UTSA. Regardless, courts are
mixed on when to grant an injunction to prevent inevitable disclosure.
In National Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Parker Chemical Corp, the court
upheld an injunction against an employer from working for a competitor
because there were adequate facts to support a “sufficient likelihood of
Minnesota law).
85. Id.
86. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn.
1992).
87. Id. (quoting E. W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1112 (8th
Cir. 1969)).
88. H & R Block Eastern Tax Servs., Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1075
(W.D. Mo. 2000).
89. Id. at 1075–76.
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inevitable disclosure” of trade secrets that would result in immediate
90
harm. The court’s decision was based on its finding that only five to
ten percent (5–10%) of the duties at the employee’s new job were
91
similar enough to threaten inevitable disclosure.
Conversely, in Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp.,
the court determined that an injunction may not be granted to eliminate
92
the possibility of a remote injury. The court went on to state that the
applicable standard for granting injunctive relief is “a ‘clear showing of
93
immediate irreparable injury’ or a ‘presently existing actual threat.’”
New York
New York also has not adopted the UTSA. Regardless, there are
many opinions addressing the issue of inevitable disclosure. Numerous
94
opinions embrace the doctrine in multiple forms, while more recent
95
opinions tend to disfavor its use all together.
North Carolina
North Carolina recognizes inevitable disclosure and will enjoin
threatened misappropriation when the injunction is narrowly drafted to
protect specific, clearly identified, and significantly valuable trade
96
secrets. Further, bad faith is not necessarily required: a showing of
disclosure due to the similarity between the two positions and the value
97
of the information will suffice.
The predominant test applied by North Carolina courts comes from
the case Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner. The Travenol court
reluctantly established that an injunction against an employee
90. Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 33 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1987).
91. Id.
92. Cont’l Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980).
93. Id. (quoting Ammond v. McGahn, 532 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1976), and
Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969)).
94. See The Estee Lauder Co. Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Int'l Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F.
Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Integr. Cash Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Trans., Inc., 732 F.
Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Business Intell. Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cont’l Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1976); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., 189 A.D. 556 (N.Y.A.D. 1919); Spinal Dimensions, Inc. v.
Chepenuk, 2007 WL 2296503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); DoubleClick Inc. v. Henderson, 1997 WL
731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
95. See Payment Alliance Int'l, Inc. v. Ferreira, 530 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); Marietta Corp. v. Fairhurst, 301 A.D.2d 734 (N.Y.S.D. 2003); Earthweb, Inc. v.
Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
96. Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
97. Id.
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protecting a former employer’s trade secrets was proper because the
98
Factors to consider are (1) the
possibility of disclosure was high.
circumstances surrounding the employee’s termination; (2) the
importance of the former employee’s position; (3) the responsibilities of
the former employee at his new position; and (4) the information sought
to be protected and the value or need of the information to the
99
competitor.
Ohio
Although Ohio courts do not explicitly refer to the doctrine in
granting injunctive relief, they will enforce a non-compete when an
actual threat of harm exists that includes an employee’s possession of an
employer’s trade secrets and the subsequent employment in a position
100
in direct competition with the employer.
Pennsylvania
In 2010, in the absence of the UTSA, the Third Circuit, applying
Pennsylvania law, applied what appears to be a more lenient version of
the doctrine. The court upheld a district court’s injunction against an
employee in the presence of a non-compete and bad faith, because
“there was ‘a substantial likelihood, if not an inevitability, that [the
employee] will disclose or use [the employer’s] trade secrets in the
101
course of his employment with [the competitor].’”
Ultimately, this standard appears more relaxed than the PepsiCo
standard, calling for only a “substantial likelihood” of disclosure. Also,
it is unclear whether bad faith is required before granting an injunction.
Texas
Texas, in the absence of the UTSA, has inconsistently applied the
102
doctrine. No case law expressly uses the term inevitable disclosure to
grant injunctive relief; however, in Rugen v. Interactive Business
Systems, Inc., the court upheld an injunction against an employee
finding that, even in the absence of an enforceable employment
agreement, “a former employee is precluded from using for his own
advantage, and to the detriment of his former employer, confidential
information or trade secrets acquired by or imparted to him in the

98. Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
99. Id.
100. Kemper Mortg., Inc. v. Russell, 2006 WL 4968120, 4–5 (S.D. Ohio); see also
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
101. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 2010)
(emphasis added).
102. QUINTO AND SINGER, supra note 7, at 100.
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103

course of his employment.” Ultimately, the court found evidence that
the employee possessed confidential information and was operating a
business in direct competition with her former employer; consequently,
the court held it was “probable” that the employee would use the
confidential information “for her benefit and to the detriment of [her
104
former employer].”
However, in the 2003 case Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v.
Bowen, although the court determined that the doctrine was
inapplicable because of the specific circumstances of the case, it did
state that it knew of “no Texas case expressly adopting the inevitable
disclosure doctrine, and it is unclear to what extent Texas courts might
adopt it or might view it as relieving an injunction applicant of showing
105
irreparable injury.”
Utah
Utah, in adopting the UTSA, provides that “actual or threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined,” and ultimately interprets
106
“threatened misappropriation” to include inevitable disclosure.
The doctrine was first introduced in Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos
Research Group Inc. In Novell, the court reasoned that inevitable
disclosure was a cause of action for “threatened misappropriation” since
it was consistent with Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
107
which allows for a preliminary injunction for a “threatened injury.”
Ultimately, “the doctrine of inevitability is used to show that the
probability of a threatened injury or misappropriation is so high that it
108
becomes ‘inevitable.’”
Virginia
109
Virginia does not recognize inevitable disclosure.
Only actual or
threatened misappropriation may be enjoined: the “mere knowledge of
103. Rugen v. Interactive Bus. Sys., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex. App. 1993)
(quoting Johnson v. American Speedreading Academy, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. Civ.
App.–Dallas 1975)).
104. Id. at 552; see also T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc.,
965 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App. 1998); Conley v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 1999 WL 89955 (Tex.
App.).
105. Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230, 242 (Tex.
App. 2003).
106. Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197,
1215 (Utah D.C. 1998).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Gov. Tech. Servs., Inc. v. IntelliSys Tech. Corp., WL 1499548, 1 (Va. Cir.
Ct.).
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trade secrets is insufficient to support an injunction under . . .[Virginia
110
law].”
Washington
Applying the doctrine consistent with PepsiCo, Washington courts
grant an injunction against an employee “where there is a high degree of
111
probability of inevitable and immediate . . . use of . . . trade secrets.”
VI. A PROPOSED WORKABLE STANDARD
It is apparent that, even after the adoption of the UTSA and after
PepsiCo presented a seemingly workable standard, the states will
continue to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine differently, contrary
to section 8 of the UTSA. The ultimate solution is enacting federal
legislation addressing trade secret protection, much like the other areas
of IP law. However, this argument will focus specifically on a solution,
in the form of a workable standard, to the problem of the lack of
uniformity regarding the states’ applications of inevitable disclosure.
Ultimately, the doctrine should be viewed as originating in section
2(a) of the UTSA, which grants relief for “actual or threatened
misappropriation,” because that is exactly what inevitable disclosure is:
the threat that an employer’s trade secrets will be misappropriated
during the course of the employee’s subsequent employment. It should
simply be characterized as threatened misappropriation subject to a
stricter standard.
Ultimately, the key to inevitable disclosure is that it should only be
applied in rare circumstances because of its hindering effect on
employee mobility. Moreover, in applying the doctrine, the initial
question the court should address is whether a valid employment
agreement exists.
A. The Doctrine in the Presence of an Employment Agreement.
Courts applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine should give
deference to an employment agreement that is narrowly drafted for the
purpose of protecting a company’s trade secrets. If the court initially
determines that a valid, narrowly drafted, employment agreement
exists, then the burden should be on the employer to show the
following: (1) that the employee was given access to the employer’s
110. Motion Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 546 S.E.2d 424, 426 (Va. 2001).
111. Solutec Corp, Inc. v. Agnew, 1997 WL 794496, 8 (Wash. Ct. App.) (quoting
Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Temco Metal Prods. v.
GT Dev. Corp., 2000 WL 556607 (D. Or.).
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trade secrets during his employment; (2) that the employee has taken a
position with a company that is in direct competition with the employer;
and (3) that the employee’s responsibilities at the competitor are similar
to his responsibilities with the former employer, such that the employee
will be unable to complete those responsibilities without relying on the
employer’s trade secrets.
Ultimately, if a former employee has signed an employment
agreement that is narrowly drafted to protect the drafting company’s
trade secrets and the employer has shown all three factors there should
be a presumption in favor of enforcing the agreement and enjoining the
employee from taking a position with a competitor. Additionally, the
injunction should be reasonable in scope and duration to protect against
disclosure, even in the absence of bad faith on behalf of the former
employee.
B. The Doctrine in the Absence of an Employment Agreement
If the court initially determines that there was not a valid
employment agreement then there should be a presumption against
enjoining the employee from taking a position with a competitor. Since
an employer is in a superior bargaining position when hiring employees,
and has the ability to condition employment upon the signing of an
employment agreement, if it fails to execute an agreement it should not
be permitted to obtain relief when an employee chooses to leave for a
competitor.
In this situation, the employer should again show the three elements
provided above. However, in addition, the employer should also show a
112
fourth element: that there was bad faith on the part of the employee.
If the employer is able to show the presence of all four elements, there
should be a strong presumption in favor of injunctive relief.
This standard excludes relief for situations in which an employment
agreement does not exist and there was no bad faith or intent to disclose
on the part of the employee. This is so because, given their inferior
bargaining power compared to employers, employees should not be
enjoined from accepting future employment opportunities in the
absence of any bad faith on their behalf; if an employer fails to have its
employees sign an employment agreement that protects its trade secrets,
it should not be able to impose an after-the-fact restriction on future
employee mobility. Furthermore, the company still has other remedies
available should actual misappropriation occur after a former employee
112. PepsiCo and Bimbo provide examples of employee bad faith.
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begins work for a competitor.
C. The Standard as a Whole
Ultimately, the inevitable disclosure doctrine should be used in rare
circumstances. When it is applied, and an injunction granted, the
injunction should be reasonable in scope and duration, taking into effect
the information to be protected. The court should initially determine
whether there is a valid employment agreement that is narrowly drafted
for the specific purpose of protecting the employer’s trade secrets. If so,
the employer bears the burden of showing the following three factors:
(1) that the employee was given access to the employer’s trade
secrets during his or her employment;
(2) that the employee has taken a position with a company that is
in direct competition with the employer; and
(3) that the employee’s responsibilities at the competitor are
similar to his or her responsibilities with the former employer,
such that the employee will be unable to complete those
responsibilities without relying on the employer’s trade secrets
Furthermore, if no employment agreement is present the employer
should have to show an additional factor:
(4) that there was bad faith or an intent to disclose the trade
secret on the part of the employee
However, in the absence of a valid, narrowly tailored, employment
agreement and bad faith, a court should not enjoin an employer from
working for his former employer’s competitor.
VII. CONCLUSION
The inevitable disclosure doctrine protects against threatened
misappropriation of trade secrets due to a company’s former employee
taking a similar position with one of its competitors. However, even
after the majority of the states adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
there was, and is, a lack of uniformity in applying a workable standard.
This lack of uniformity is directly contrary to section 8 of the UTSA,
which specifically calls for the uniform application of trade secret laws
by the states adopting the Act. Consequently, there is a need for
uniformity among the states’ applications of trade secret law, and more
specifically, the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Uniformity could be
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accomplished by federal legislation regulating trade secret law, much
like the other areas of intellectual property; however, for purposes of
this comment, only a specific standard for applying the inevitable
disclosure doctrine was presented.
In presenting a proposed standard it is important to note that the
doctrine should be applied rarely, and deference should be given to
employers that utilize valid employment agreements in an attempt to
protect their trade secrets. An injunction should then be imposed if the
employee had access to a trade secret and the employee’s new position
is at a competitor and is similar to his or her former position. However,
if a valid employment agreement is not present, the doctrine should not
be utilized unless there is a showing of employee bad faith.
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